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Abstract
The popularity of smartphone messaging apps like WhatsApp
are revolutionizing how many users communicate and inter-
act with the internet. Characteristics such as the immediacy
of messages directly delivered to the user’s phone and secure
communication through end-to-end encryption have made
this tool unique but also allowed it to be extensively abused
to create and spread misinformation. Due to the private en-
crypted nature of the messages it is hard to track the dis-
semination of misinformation at scale. In this work, we pro-
pose an approach for WhatsApp to counter misinformation
that does not rely on content moderation. The idea is based
on on-device checking, where WhatsApp can detect when a
user shares multimedia content which have been previously
labeled as misinformation by fact-checkers, without violat-
ing the privacy of the users. We evaluate the potential of this
strategy for combating misinformation using data collected
from both fact-checking agencies and WhatsApp during re-
cent elections in Brazil and India. Our results show that our
approach has the potential to detect a considerable amount
of images containing misinformation, reducing 40.7% and
82.2% of their shares in Brazil and India, respectively.
Introduction
Social media platforms have dramatically changed how peo-
ple to consume and share news. An individual user can
reach as many readers as other traditional media nowa-
days (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). Also, social commu-
nication around news is becoming more private as mes-
saging apps continue to grow around the world. With over
1.5 billion users, WhatsApp plays an important role in this
conjecture as it has become a primary network for dis-
cussing and sharing news in countries like Brazil and India
where smartphones’ use for news access is already much
higher than other devices, including desktop computers and
tablets (Newman et al. 2019).
Amid this massive flow of information with more than 55
billion messages a day, of which 4.5 billion are images1, a
large amount of misinformation is posted on this network
without any moderation. Several works have already shown
1https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000631/Connectinganuser-
users-all-days
how misinformation has negatively affected the democratic
discussion in some countries (Moreno, Garrison, and Bhat
2017; Resende et al. 2019) and even lead to violent lynch-
ings (Arun 2019).
Unlike social platforms such as Twitter and Facebook,
which can enforce moderation, the end-to-end encrypted
(E2EE) structure of WhatsApp creates a very different sce-
nario where this is not possible. Only the users involved in
the conversation have access to the content shared, shielding
abusive content from being removed. The key challenge is
to fight misinformation in WhatsApp keeping it as a secure
communication channel based on end-to-end encryption.
In this work we propose a moderation methodology in
which WhatsApp can automatically detect when a user
shares images and videos which have previously been la-
beled as misinformation, similar to how Facebook would
flag content for fake news2 without violating the privacy of
the user and compromising the E2EE within the messaging
service. The solution is based on having hashes of previously
fact-checked content on the device of the user, which can be
quickly checked before the content is encrypted. We evalu-
ate the potential of this strategy of combating misinforma-
tion using data collected from both fact-checking agencies
and WhatsApp during recent elections in Brazil and India.
Our results show that our approach has the potential to de-
tect a considerable amount of images containing misinfor-
mation, reducing 40.7% and 82.2% of their shares in Brazil
and India, respectively.
Background and Motivation
The emergence of E2EE based communication on What-
sApp has provided a new channel to smartphone users,
which is seen as significantly more private and secure than
other social media platforms like Facebook (Simon et al.
2016). WhatsApp’s E2EE is an important element that en-
sures user privacy and security, mainly during critical and
crisis events. Malka et al. (Malka, Ariel, and Avidar 2015)
demonstrate this importance of WhatsApp in the lives of
its users during the wartime in Israel. They show the multi-
functional role of the messaging app, functioning as a mass
2https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/22/
facebook-fact-checking-tool-fake-news
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
02
47
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  3
 Ju
n 2
02
0
WhatsApp Server
Is it
fake?
Flags
Initiator
Yes
No Is it
fake?
Flags 
Recipient
Yes
No
Fact-checked 
ImagesData Structureof Hashes
Local Environment
(Initiator)
Local Environment
(Recipient)
E2EEE2EE
Figure 1: Proposed architecture.
as well as an interpersonal communication channel. Face-
book, WhatsApp’s parent company has tried to implement
this model across other Facebook properties like Messen-
ger, which has lead WhatsApp and encryption to become
the subject of public, media, and political discourse, with
some governments arguing that WhatsApp needs to provide
legal backdoors for security and law enforcement purposes3
or enable tracing the source of problematic messages.4 On
the other hand, privacy advocates and WhatsApp argue that
such a move would completely break E2EE and hence a
threat to protecting users’ information. They argue that be-
cause of E2EE, moderating content is a challenging task on
WhatsApp since any attempt to look at the content would
compromise the security of the communication.
In this paper, we show that there is a simple way to find
harmful messages without violating user privacy or creat-
ing a threatening surveillance backdoor. Automatic classifi-
cation through machine learning, users reporting messages
and repositories of popular content are means to stop mis-
information that are compatible with E2EE, as pointed by
recent reports (Gupta and Taneja 2018; Mayer 2019).
Our proposed solution was designed with three main con-
siderations: (i) It should be easy to implement, by allowing
WhatsApp to port our solution to their existing infrastructure
without much changes; (ii) it must be flexible, be able to de-
tect as much misinformation as possible, at scale, and adapt
to the ever-changing trends in misinformation creation; and,
(iii) it must not compromise the end-to-end encryption ser-
vices that WhatsApp provides. Based on these considera-
tions, we propose our solution, that cover parts of the spec-
trum, basing on two key ingredients:
1. A database of previously fact-checked content: Since
Facebook already has partnerships with several fact-
checking agencies around the world, such a database is
not hard to obtain. Moreover, Facebook also collects me-
dia items reported as problematic images (misinformation,
3https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/us/politics/barr-
whatsapp-facebook-encryption.html
4https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-whatsapp-
government/india-government-meets-with-whatsapp-over-
tracing-of-fake-news-source-idUSKBN1O60GO
hateful, etc) through its internal review processes.
2. Algorithms for hashing and matching similar media con-
tent: A hashing algorithm provides a signature to represent
an image or video. Given the exact same content, the hashing
algorithm produces the same hash. Multiple types of hash
functions exist to achieve this goal. In this work, we are pri-
marily interested in two types of hash functions: a. Cryp-
tographic hash, b. Perceptual hash. A cryptographic hash
is a one way hash function based on techniques like MD5
or SHA, and produces a string hash given an image. How-
ever, even changing a single pixel in the image changes the
hash completely. Hence cryptographic hashes can be used
to only detect exact matches. On the other hand, percep-
tual hashing takes care of the drawbacks of a cryptographic
hash and produces a hash that can be used to compare sim-
ilar images. Even if the image is slightly rotated, cropped
or has text added, a good perceptual hashing technique can
produce a hash that is similar to the original image. There
are multiple algorithms to produce perceptual hashes such
as Facebook PDQ Hashing, pHash, Microsoft PhotoDNA 5,
etc. Perceptual hashing is already widely used today for de-
tecting known harmful content (Farid 2018) and authenti-
cation of images (Swaminathan, Yinian Mao, and Min Wu
2006).
Architecture
An overview of the proposed architecture is shown in Fig-
ure 1 can be explained in the following steps: (i) WhatsApp
maintains a set of hashes of images which have been pre-
viously fact-checked, either from publicly available sources
or through internal review processes. (ii) These hashes are
shipped with the WhatsApp app, storing it on a user’s phone.
This step can be periodically updated based on images that
Facebook’s moderators have been fact-checking on Face-
book, which is much more openly accessible. This set could
be condensed and efficiently stored using existing proba-
bilistic data structures like Bloom Filters (Song et al. 2005).
(iii) Once a user intends to send an image, WhatsApp checks
whether it already exists in the hashed set on the user’s de-
vice. If so, a warning confirmation is displayed, asking if
the user really wants to share this content. (iv) The message
is encrypted and transferred through the usual E2EE meth-
ods. (v) When the recipient user receives the message, What-
sApp decrypts the image on the phone, obtains a perceptual
hash and also checks it on hashed set on the receiver’s end.
(vi) If it already exists, the content is flagged, and a warn-
ing is shown to the user indicating that the image could be
potential misinformation. Also, providing information about
where the image was fact-checked; and in addition, also pre-
vent the image from being forwarded further.
This architecture requires changes in WhatsApp, as it in-
troduces a new component containing hashes stored on the
phone and also checking images. It provides high flexibil-
ity and the ability to detect near similar images, hence in-
creasing the coverage and effectiveness in countering misin-
formation. This architecture also fully abides by the current
5https://github.com/facebook/ThreatExchange/tree/master/
hashing/tmk, https://www.phash.org, and https://www.microsoft.
com/en-us/photodna
E2EE pipeline WhatsApp has, where WhatsApp does not
have access to any content information.6 All the matching
and intervention is done on the device without the need for
any aggregate metadata in the message. Facebook could op-
tionally keep statistics of how many times a match occurred
to establish the prevalence and virality of different types of
misinformation and to collect stats about users who repeat-
edly send such content. Note that similar designs have been
proposed recently in informing policy decisions in light of
governments requesting a backdoor in the encryption (Gupta
and Taneja 2018; Mayer 2019).
It is important to mention that while WhatsApp messages
are secure in transit, the endpoint devices, such as smart-
phones and computers, do not offer security. In this sense,
our architecture adds new components to the client, adding
also more potential for security breaches.
We say that our solution is practical, and deployable be-
cause it is an industry-standard to detect unlawful behavior
in social media platforms (Farid 2018). For example, What-
sApp scans all unencrypted information on its network such
as user/group profile photos, and group metadata for unlaw-
ful content such as child pornography, drugs, etc. If flagged,
these are manually verified (Constine 2018) and the abus-
ing accounts are banned. Our proposal extends the same
methodology to the user’s device in order to enable private
detection.
The method works to prevent coordinated disinformation
campaigns that are particularly important during elections7
and other high profile national events8, but also stops basic
misinformation, where a lack of awareness leads to spread-
ing. For instance, while manually labeling the fact-checked
misinformation images, we observed that roughly 15% of
the images in our data were related to false health informa-
tion. These are forwarded mostly with the assumption that
they might help someone in case they are true. In some cases
(e.g. the child kidnapping rumors (Arun 2019)), such benign
forwarding of misinformation lead to violence and killing9.
Datasets
In order to evaluate the practical potential of the proposed ar-
chitecture, we need a large dataset from WhatsApp contain-
ing misinformation and a large dataset from fact-checkers
identifying which content is fake. In this section, we explain
how we gathered (i) a dataset from public WhatsApp groups
discussing politics from Brazil and India, and (ii) a dataset of
fact-checked misinformation images from publicly available
fact-checking websites.
WhatsApp Data. To gather the data explored in this work
we use available tools (Garimella and Tyson 2018) to get
access to messages posted on public WhatsApp groups. We
6https://www.whatsapp.com/security/WhatsApp-Security-
Whitepaper.pdf
7https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/technology/whatsapp-
brazil-presidential-election.html
8https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/21/social-
media-shut-down-in-sri-lanka-in-bid-to-stem-misinformation
9https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/pranavdixit/whatsapp-
destroyed-village-lynchings-rainpada-india
Table 1: WhatsApp collection.
#Users #Groups
Unique
Images
Total
images
Time Span
Brazil 17,465 414 4,524 34,109 2018/08 - 2018/11
India 63,500 4,250 509k 810k 2019/02 - 2019/06
selected over 400 and 4,200 groups from Brazil and India,
respectively, dedicated to political discussions. The period
of data collection for both countries includes the respec-
tive national elections in these countries. Public groups have
been shown to be well used in both countries (Newman et
al. 2019; Lokniti 2018) and contain a large amount of misin-
formation (Resende et al. 2019; Melo et al. 2019a). For this
work, we choose to filter only messages containing images.
The dataset used in this work is publicly available (Reis et
al. 2020) and can be found in the following link: http://doi.
org/10.5281/zenodo.3779157. The dataset overview and the
total number of users, groups and distinct images are de-
scribed in Table 1. Note that the volume of content for India
is ten times bigger than Brazil.
Fact-checked Images. To collect a set of misinformation
that already spread we obtained images that were fact-
checked in the past by fact-checking agencies for each coun-
try. First, we crawl all images which were fact-checked from
popular fact-checking websites from Brazil10 and India11.
For each of these images, we also obtained the date when
they were fact-checked. Second, we used Google reverse im-
age search to check whether one of the main fact-checking
domains were returned when searching for an image in our
database. If so, we parsed the fact-checking page and au-
tomatically labeled the image as fake or true depending on
how the image was tagged on the fact-checking page (Re-
sende et al. 2019). In total, we collected over 100k fact-
checked images from Brazil and about 20k images from In-
dia.
Next, we used a state-of-the-art perceptual hashing based
image matching technique, PDQ hashing12, to look for oc-
currences of the fact-checked images in our public groups
data. The PDQ hashing algorithm is an improvement over
the commonly used pHash (Zauner 2010) and produces a
256 bit hash using a discrete cosine transformation algo-
rithm. PDQ is used by Facebook to detect similar content
is the best known state-of-the-art approach for clustering to-
gether similar images. The hashing algorithm can detect near
similar images, even if they were cropped differently or they
have small amounts of text overlaid on them.
Finally, not all images which are fact-checked contain
misinformation. To make sure our dataset was accurately
built, we manually verified each image that appears in both
the fact-checking websites and in the WhatsApp data.
As shown in Table 2 our final dataset of images previously
10aosfatos.org, g1.globo.com/e-ou-nao-e/, www.e-farsas.com,
veja.abril.com.br/blog/me-engana-que-eu-posto/, piaui.folha.uol.
com.br/lupa/, and www.boatos.org
11altnews.in,boomlive.in,smhoaxslayer.com,factchecker.
in,factly.in,fakenewscounter.com,check4spam.com
12https://github.com/facebook/ThreatExchange/blob/master/
hashing/hashing.pdf
Table 2: Amount of misinformation image shared on What-
sApp and comparison of shares before and after the checking
date of fact-checking agencies.
Misinformation
Images found
100% Exact
Matches
Total
Shares
%Shares
After
Checking
Max Shares
After
Checking
Brazil 135 7 2,209 40.7 96
India 205 83 2,944 82.2 1,089
fact-checked contains 135 images from Brazil and 205 im-
ages from India, which were shown to contain misinforma-
tion. It is important to highlight that many checking agencies
do not post the actual image that has been disseminated. Of-
ten only altered versions of the image are posted and other
versions of the false story are omitted to avoid contribut-
ing to the spreading of misinformation. This leads to us to
have a small number of matches compared to the total num-
ber of fact-checked images we obtained, but that is sufficient
to properly investigate the feasibility of the proposed archi-
tecture. Direct contact with the fact-checking agencies, like
Facebook already does, could increase the size of the fact-
checked set much more. Note that even though the set of
fact-checked images was small, the fact that these images
have been fact-checked means that they were popular and
spread widely. Table 2 shows a summary of the fact-checked
images and their activity in our dataset. While similar per-
ceptual hashes are able to identify more than a hundred im-
ages in both countries, using just exactly the same hash to
find misinformation, only 5,1% of checked images on Brazil
were retrieved and 40% of Indian images.
Potential Prevention of Misinformation
In this section, we evaluate the potential prevention of mis-
information in case our architecture was implemented, and
the spreading of these images were totally blocked immedi-
ately after the fact-checking happens. For this, we computed
the timestamp of all the fact-checked images and the occur-
rence of these images in our WhatsApp data. This way, we
are able to measure how many posts were done for each mis-
information image before and after the first fact check of this
image.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the number of shares done before and after the
checking of the misinformation images. We can observe in
both countries that for the most broadly shared images there
are as many posts before as after the checking date. More-
over, for India, there are more shares after checking than
before and there are even images with up to 1,000 shares af-
ter fact-checking while the maximum shares before do not
exceed 100.
Summing all shares, we find that 40.7% of the misinfor-
mation image shares in Brazil and 82.2%13 of the shares
in India could have been avoided by flagging the image
and preventing it from being forwarded after being fact-
13This number drops to 71.7% if we remove the outlier image
with the maximum number of shares, as it was shared over 1000
times.
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Figure 2: Cumulative distributions of shares misinformation
images before/after fact-checking on both countries.
checked. This demonstrates the importance of using fact-
checking agencies to combat misinformation on WhatsApp
highlighting the potential of our proposed approach.
Conclusions
In this work, we propose a practical solution that WhatsApp
could implement to prevent misinformation from spreading
while ensuring user’s privacy. The solution is based on hav-
ing a set of already fact-checked image hashes on the user’s
device and matching these images with the content being
shared. We would expect that by the time fact checking or-
ganizations receive and fact check a piece of content, most
of its spread would be done, thus defeating the purpose of
fact checking. However, as our results show, in part because
of the closed nature of the platform, and the lack of a cen-
tral authority to stop the spread, there are images that keep
spreading even long after being fact checked. Looking at
the actual sharing of these images in our data, we show that
over 40% of the spreading of the misinformation detected in
Brazil and 82% in India could have been prevented by im-
plementing these measures in the public groups we monitor.
Apart from presenting a simple, practical and deployable so-
lution to the problem, our paper presents a counter-voice to
strong claims by governments to allow back doors in the en-
cryption for law and order purposes. Finally, our approach is
also in line with WhatsApp’s efforts to limit forwarding. As
showed in recent studies (Melo et al. 2019b), this approach
can impose delays in the content dissemination, which rep-
resent an extra time for fact-checking and more effectiveness
for our approach.
Limitations. Labeling and implementing forwarding re-
strictions on already known fake images can only help to
a certain degree. Our proposal has a few limitations: (i)
Does labeling actually make a difference? Firstly, careful
considerations must be taken in order to prevent backfire ef-
fect (Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Levin 2017); (ii) Our dataset
from WhatsApp is not representative, since it comes from
public groups which are a small fraction of all groups. How-
ever, this is the largest available sample of WhatsApp data
to test such an architecture. (iii) The amount of misinforma-
tion that could be prevented could be an overestimate be-
cause these fact-checked images are already popular. Even
though our approach does not remove all misinformation, it
can help remove popular, viral misinformation that has al-
ready been fact-checked. Given that only a small amount of
content gets viral on WhatsApp (Melo et al. 2019b), such
efforts are helpful to prevent lethal mis/disinformation cam-
paigns and rumors.
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